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by Mark Hulbert – Wednesday, June 15, 2011
A look at four different sentiment measures suggests that more pain may await investors
Did the bull market end on May 3?
That was when the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 12807.51 — which, at least so far, is the Dow’s closing high for the rally that began in March 2009.
Contrarian analysis can’t rule out that possibility. In fact, the behavior of various sentiment indexes in recent months is disturbingly similar to what has happened on the occasion of prior bull-market tops.
At least that is what I found after analyzing four different sentiment measures. I looked at the Investors Intelligence weekly survey of newsletter sentiment, data for which extended back to 1963. Specifically, I focused on the ratio of bullish advisors in this survey to the total of those who are either bullish or bearish.
I also analyzed the sentiment index maintained by Hulbert Financial Digest (HFD). It represents the average recommended equity exposure among a subset of short-term stock-market timers who are monitored by the HFD.
I sifted through the American Association of Individual Investors sentiment survey. As in the case of Investors Intelligence, I focused on the ratio of bullish responses in the AAII survey to the total of those who reported that they are either bullish or bearish.
Finally, I focused on the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Market Volatility Index, or VIX.
I analyzed how each of these four sentiment indicators behaved on the occasion of past bull-market tops, using the precise definition employed by Ned Davis Research, the institutional research firm. I found that sentiment is remarkably correlated with the stock market.
In fact, in nearly half the cases studied, bullish sentiment peaked at almost the same time as the market — within fewer than five trading sessions before or after. It rarely has peaked more than a month or two before or after the top.
Because of this close correlation, sentiment can be used as a reality check on whether a market top has indeed been registered. If more than a few months separate the peak in sentiment and the date of the closing high up until that point, for example, chances are that the final top has not been seen. Another sign that the top has not yet been registered: Sentiment has peaked at much lower levels than those that prevailed at prior tops.
Unfortunately, on both grounds it’s hard to rule out the suspicion that the May 3 top could be the end of the bull market.
According to the Investors Intelligence data, sentiment peaked on April 5, 28 days prior to the exact day of the May 3 high. On April 5, the ratio of bullish advisors to those who were either bullish or bearish came in at 78.5%, higher than the average level of 76.2% that stood on the occasion of prior bull-market tops.
According to the HFD survey, sentiment peaked on May 3, the very day of the market’s top. The average exposure level then stood at 67.2%, versus an average of 79.6% from prior market tops. According to the AAII survey, sentiment peaked on Dec. 23 of last year, or more than four months prior to May 3. The ratio of bullish responses in the Dec. 23 survey to those indicating that they were either bullish or bearish stood at 79.4%, higher than the 78.7% average from prior tops. According to the VIX, investor optimism reached its apogee on April 28, five days prior to the day of the top. The VIX on April 28 closed at 14.62, which is less than the 15.51 average from prior bull-market tops.
Notice that the extreme levels of investor optimism recently reported by the various sentiment indexes are, in three out of the four cases studied, actually higher than the averages seen at prior bull-market tops. Notice also that, in three out of the four cases, the sentiment peak came within only a few days of the market’s top.
Can contrarian-oriented traders, nevertheless, find comfort in the equity fund flow data? You may recall that those flows provided one of the strongest contrarian-based supports for this bull market in 2009 and 2010, as mutual-fund investors in both of those years pulled more money out of domestic equity funds and exchange-traded funds than they put back in.
This year, however, the situation has changed. TrimTabs Investment Research estimates that, following net outflows of $46.9 billion and $51.9 billion in 2009 and 2010, respectively, this year (through June 8th) there has been a net inflow totaling $28.8 billion. So we no longer have the strong wall of worry that the bull market last year was able to climb.
To be sure, this year’s inflows are not as large as those seen at prior bull-market tops. So the flow data are not, in themselves, sending any contrarian-based alarm bells. But, by the same token, those data no longer are providing the strongly bullish foundation that they were in each of the past two years.
The bottom line? The sentiment data no longer provide strong contrarian support for a bull market. And a number of the sentiment indexes are, or very close to, flashing outright sell signals
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LONDON (MarketWatch) — The European Central Bank, with its staunch opposition to sovereign debt restructuring in Europe, is making a bad situation worse. By threatening to withdraw support for banks in countries such as Greece if they restructure their debts, the ECB is practically inciting runs on banks.
The argument that Greek state paper could no longer be used as collateral in such cases hardly justifies such a potentially destabilizing step. The ECB is effectively the lender of last resort to such banks. If depositors believe it is about to pull out, then they will withdraw money from the banks — and we will face a self-fuelling downward spiral.
The debt problem of peripheral Europe is structural. It cannot be solved by piling debt on debt. There is an analogy to a Ponzi scheme, under which more money is continually paid in to keep the pyramid-like edifice from collapsing. The debt/GDP ratio increases over time because new loans are given to pay old debt and to finance the remaining fiscal gaps.
In addition, the share of the debt in official hands continues to increase and eventually taxpayers bear the complete cost of the adjustment. This may, however, take time and, since the pyramid is unstable, the construction could break down at any moment — a source of increasing uncertainty.
The International Monetary Fund so far has not performed well in peripheral Europe. It was a mistake to assume that a country like Greece can re-enter the private-sector credit markets next year. This is impossible. It is even more difficult after 2013 under the perverse permanent bailout scheme where protection for private-sector creditors is progressively lowered. Programs are based on illusory “debt sustainability scenarios” that ignore that they lead to recession where countries have no chance of outgrowing their debt.
“There is no solution without debt relief, which means, without euphemisms, default.”
Mario Blejer
As for privatization, this is a red herring. It is useful as a short-term stopgap and for improving productivity but a fire sale of assets cannot solve the debt problem. If there is no demand for Greek debt, then there cannot be too much demand for Greek equity.
The Argentine experience during the first decade of the 21st century is instructive. So are the broader lessons of the Latin American debt restructuring in the 1980s and also that of Mexico in 1994.
Fiscal adjustment and structural reforms are crucial and necessary conditions, and privatization may play a small role, but there is no solution without debt relief, which means, without euphemisms, default. This should be nonconfrontational and as amicable as possible.
Collateralized new bonds (along the model of the Brady bonds initiative in the late 1980s) form the best procedure. This could be backed by direct liquidity and recapitalization actions for the creditor banks under similar conditions to the 2009 “Vienna model” successfully used for central and eastern Europe.
However, without significant write-downs of existing debt, there is no way out.
Contrary to the ECB’s stated view, it is easier to regain credit market access after a significant reduction of the debt burden, as both Uruguay and Argentina showed. The latter did not handle the matter well until 2005 but corporations were soon back in the market. Today, while the issue is not fully resolved, Argentine borrowers can borrow at half the spread paid by Greece.
With regard to the fear of contagion to other countries, explicit debt relief for the most-badly hit EMU members may actually relieve the pressure on Spain and others — as long as the money used today to pay bondholders is channelled directly to recapitalize and sanitize the banking system.
Regarding the ECB’s opposition, I am convinced that the question is not whether but when the ECB will do a U-turn (as it did with purchasing bonds in the secondary markets in May 2010).
There is a good argument for taking necessary decisions on debt restructuring sooner rather than later. Further “muddling through” is a recipe for disaster. Unless a proper program of coordination and adjustment combined with debt relief is decided soon, Europe faces the risk of becoming the next emerging market.
Mario Blejer was president of the Central Bank of Argentina, and has held top positions at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Bank of England. This article originally appeared in the Bulletin of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. Read more here.
Mario I. Blejer – Para LA NACIONhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh Domingo 27 de marzo de 2011
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hhhhhEl panorama económico internacional ha sido afectado considerablemente por los eventos geopolíticos recientes. Sin embargo, es posible analizar la situación sosteniendo que, en el contexto de la recuperación de la crisis financiera, el escenario base, es decir aquel con mayor probabilidad de realizarse, no ha cambiado significativamente. No obstante, han aumentado el número y la magnitud de los riesgos sistémicos.
hhhhh¿Cuál sería el escenario base? En primer lugar, continúa siendo convincente un escenario en el cual no hay una recaída en la recesión global, sino una pequeña desaceleración en el ritmo de crecimiento. Segundo, que este crecimiento es altamente asimétrico. Las economías industriales continúan recuperándose a un ritmo sostenido, pero mediocre y no alcanzan a reducir las altas tasas de desempleo derivadas de la recesión.
hhhhhMás aún, esta recuperación está altamente sostenida en un fuerte estímulo monetario y fiscal. Por su parte, las economías emergentes mantienen un crecimiento rápido basado en la mejora sustantiva de sus variables macroeconómicas, impulsando y, a su vez, siendo beneficiadas de los altos precios de las commodities .
hhhhhPero este escenario base está siendo amenazado por una intensificación de riesgos globales. El primero de ellos es el claro deterioro de la situación fiscal en los países avanzados y la crisis de la deuda en la periferia europea.
hhhhhLa situación de las cuentas públicas en las economías industriales es preocupante. Las necesidades de financiamiento (déficit corriente más vencimiento de deuda) están llegando a niveles históricamente inusuales. Estas necesidades alcanzan casi el 30% del producto bruto interno (PBI) para los Estados Unidos y entre 20% y 25% del PBI para un gran número de economías europeas.
hhhhhA pesar de las decisiones alcanzadas en la cumbre europea este fin de semana, la probabilidad de un default en algunas de las economías periféricas no ha disminuido. Los números indican que tanto en Grecia, Irlanda, Portugal y España, aun con los fuertes ajustes implementados, la deuda pública como porcentaje del producto continúa creciendo este año y el próximo.
hhhhhEl segundo riesgo sistémico deriva del alto crecimiento de las economías emergentes. Esto ha llevado a un incremento en las presiones inflacionarias, particularmente en el rubro alimentos, que podría inducir a la adopción de políticas macroeconómicas contractivas. El temor es que estas medidas puedan frenar abruptamente el crecimiento y causar una desaceleración significativa en la tasa de crecimiento mundial. Se ha notado en los últimos meses una disminución en el entusiasmo por los emergentes, reflejado en una baja en los flujos de capital. Una corrección moderada puede ser vista positivamente, pero un “frenazo” conlleva el potencial de una desaceleración global.
El peso de la geopolítica
hhhhhA estos riesgos se les suman los eventos geopolíticos recientes: la tragedia de Japón, la guerra en Libia y los disturbios en Medio Oriente.
hhhhhAun cuando Japón sea la tercera economía global, el impacto directo sobre la actividad económica mundial de la destrucción y la futura reconstrucción del país son contenidos.
hhhhhSin embargo, el descrédito de la energía nuclear como alternativa a los combustibles fósiles se suma a la presión que los acontecimientos en Medio Oriente han puesto sobre los precios del petróleo. Esta última variable es la que más temor está provocando en términos de los riesgos sistémicos.
hhhhhCabe recordar que el precio del petróleo comenzó a subir meses antes de los disturbios en Medio Oriente como consecuencia de un crecimiento sostenido de su demanda como parte del proceso de recuperación. La pregunta hoy es cuán permanente es el nivel actual de precios.
hhhhhAunque las opiniones divergen, puede decirse que la inestabilidad política en los países productores tenderá a reducir la inversión y que la menor sustitución hacia alternativas nucleares se conjuguen en el mantenimiento de un precio de petróleo elevado. Sin embargo, a diferencia de otros shocks petroleros, es posible que el efecto global de esta suba de precios sea más restringido. La principal razón para realizar esta aseveración es el destino de los fondos transferidos de los países demandantes a los países productores. Cuando en el pasado gran parte de esta transferencia se convertía en “petrodólares” ahorrados en el sector financiero, hoy es de esperar que, dada la situación política cambiante, los países productores deban aumentar en forma sustancial el gasto social y las transferencias a su población, lo que tiene el potencial de aumentar el consumo mundial compensando la caída en los países importadores.
hhhhhEn resumen, los riesgos actuales son más numerosos e intensos. No obstante, la recuperación global, aunque pueda debilitarse, no se descarrilará en el futuro mediato. Con todo, el mundo es menos amigable que un año atrás y hay que estar alerta a los rápidos cambios que acontecen para tomar las medidas necesarias si los escenarios negativos se concretan.
El autor presidió el Banco Central
Escuchando los audios podras verificar el enorme porcentaje de acierto de nuestros especialistas.
La continuidad de aciertos de compra en los mínimos del mercado ( 21/11/08 – 10/03/09) sumado a la continuidad de aciertos de venta en los techos del mercado (04/05/10 y 09/03/11), hicieron que el contraste comparativo con el resto de los especialistas (incluyendo bancos y agentes de bolsa internacionales y locales) fuese mayúsculo. Las enormes utilidades generadas en el período de mayores dificultades, evidenciaron la calidad de la información utilizada. En momentos de mayor tranquilidad en el mercado, estas diferencias suelen no distinguirse.bitrar
Gracias a la enorme crisis internacional pudo percibirse sin duda alguna la capacidad predictiva de nuestros especialistas.
En el grafico podrán observarse tres pisos significativos, donde se recomendo comprar y dos techos importantes, donde se recomendo desarmar posiciones. Puede escucharse en los audios del medio oficial de la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires la precisión de dichas afirmaciones. Los días en los que se marcaron minimos en el mercado, y los días en los que se marcaron maximos, fueron detectados y señalados publicamente.
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Conocemos el mercado global y poseemos la información adecuada en el momento indicado para movernos ágilmente manteniendo la visión de largo plazo multiplicadora del capital
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Cuando nadie creia que la suba del euro finalizaría, cuando ningun especialista imaginaba que el dolar dejaría de caer. Los Banqueros Centrales reunidos en Estambúl (2009) unánimemente consideraron que era imposible. Desde el 7 de Octubre del 2009, comenzamos a advertir acerca del acontecimiento inminente. Comprobalo vos mismo:
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07/10/2009 – Descargar entrevista a Mario Blejer
(Ex Presidente del BCRA y Ex director del Banco Central de Inglaterra) *
13/10/2009 – Descargar entrevista a Luis Palma Cané
(Economista, especializado en Finanzas Internacionales)
14/10/2009 - Descargar entrevista a Arnaldo Bocco (Director del BCRA) *
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